We give a detailed account of the use of Q-curve reductions to construct elliptic curves over F p 2 with efficiently computable endomorphisms, which can be used to accelerate elliptic curve-based cryptosystems in the same way as Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) and Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) endomorphisms. Like GLS (which is a degenerate case of our construction), we offer the advantage over GLV of selecting from a much wider range of curves and thus finding secure group orders when p is fixed for efficient implementation. Unlike GLS, we also offer the possibility of constructing twist-secure curves. We construct several one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with efficient endomorphisms for every p > 3, and exhibit examples of twist-secure curves over F p 2 for the efficient Mersenne prime p = 2 127 − 1.
Introduction
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , and let G ⊆ E(F q ) be a cyclic subgroup of prime order N . When implementing cryptographic protocols in G, the fundamental operation is scalar multiplication (or exponentiation):
Given P in G and m in Z, compute [m]P:= P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P nentiation algorithms, the cost of computing ψ, and the cost of doublings and addings in terms of bit operations-to say nothing of the cryptographic protocol, which may prohibit some other conventional speedups. For example, in [16] , Galbraith, Lin, and Scott report experiments where cryptographic operations on GLS curves required between 70 and 83 % of the time required for the previous best practice curves-with the variation depending on the architecture, the underlying curve arithmetic, and the protocol in question.
To put this technique into practice, we need a source of cryptographic elliptic curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms. In the large characteristic case, 3 there are two archetypal constructions:
1. The classic Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) construction [17] uses elliptic curves with explicit complex multiplication (CM) by quadratic orders with tiny discriminants. These curves can be found by reducing CM curves over number fields modulo suitable primes. 2. The more recent Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) construction [16] . Here, curves over F p are viewed over F p 2 ; the p-power sub-Frobenius induces an extremely efficient endomorphism on the quadratic twist (which can have prime order).
GLV and GLS have been combined to give higher-dimensional variants for elliptic curves ( [29, 50] ), and extended to hyperelliptic curves ( [4, 27, 40, 47] ).
New endomorphisms from Q-curves This work develops a new source of elliptic curves over F p 2 with efficient endomorphisms: reductions of quadratic Q-curves.
Definition 1.
A quadratic Q-curve of degree d is an elliptic curve E without CM, defined over a quadratic number field K , such that there exists an isogeny of degree d from E to its Galois conjugate σ E (formed by applying σ to the coefficients of the defining equation of E), where σ = Gal(K /Q).
Q-curves are well-established objects of interest in number theory, where they have formed a natural setting for generalizations of the Modularity Theorem. We recommend Ellenberg [12] for an excellent introduction to the theory.
Our application of quadratic Q-curves is somewhat more prosaic: given a d-isogeny E → σ E over a quadratic field, we reduce modulo an inert prime p to obtain an isogeny E → σ E over F p 2 . We then exploit the fact that the p-power Frobenius isogeny maps σ E back onto E; composing with the reduced d-isogeny, we obtain an endomorphism of E of degree dp. For efficiency, d must be small; happily, for small values of d, Hasegawa has written down universal one-parameter families of Q-curves [20] . We thus obtain one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with efficient non-integer endomorphisms. 4 For concrete examples, we consider d = 2, 3, 5, and 7 in Sects. 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. We define our curves in short Weierstrass form for maximum generality and flexibility, but we also give isomorphisms to Montgomery, twisted Edwards, and Doche-Icart-Kohel models where appropriate.
Comparison with GLV Like GLV, our method involves reducing curves defined over number fields to obtain curves over finite fields with explicit CM. However, we emphasize a profound difference: In our method, the curves over number fields generally do not have CM themselves.
GLV curves are necessarily isolated examples, and the really useful examples are extremely limited in number (cf. [29, App. A] ). The scarcity of GLV curves is their Achilles' heel: As noted in [16] , if p is fixed then there is no guarantee that there will exist a GLV curve with prime (or almost-prime) order over F p . While we discuss this phenomenon further in §9, it is instructive to consider the example discussed in [16, §1] : The most efficient GLV curves have CM discriminants −3 and −4. If we are working at the 128-bit security level, then taking p = 2 255 − 19 allows particularly fast arithmetic in F p . But the largest prime factor of the order of a curve over F p with CM discriminant −4 (resp. −3) has 239 (resp. 230) bits: using these curves wastes nine (resp. 13) potential bits of security. In fact, we are lucky with −3 and −4: For all of the other discriminants offering endomorphisms of degree at most 3, we can do no better than a 95-bit prime factor, which represents a catastrophic 80-bit loss of relative security.
In contrast, our construction yields true families of curves, covering ∼ p isomorphism classes over F p 2 for any choice of p. This gives us a vastly higher probability of finding secure curves over practically important fields.
Comparison with GLS Like GLS, we construct curves over F p 2 equipped with an inseparable endomorphism. And like GLS, each of our families offers around p distinct isomorphism classes of curves, making it easy to find secure group orders when p is fixed.
But unlike GLS, our curves have j-invariants in F p 2 and not F p : They are not isomorphic to, or twists of, subfield curves. This allows us to find twist-secure curves, that is, curves with secure orders whose twists also have secure orders.
Twist security is crucial in many elliptic curve-based protocols (including [5, 23, 24, 30] , and [7] ); it is particularly important in modern x-coordinate-only ECDH implementations, such as Bernstein's Curve25519 software [2] (which anticipates the kind of fault attack detailed in [13] ). GLS curves cannot be used in any of these constructions.
As we will see in §3, our construction degenerates to GLS when d = 1. Our construction is therefore a sort of generalized GLS-though it is not the higher-degree generalization anticipated by Galbraith, Lin, and Scott themselves, which composes a p-power sub-Frobenius endomorphism with a non-rational separable isogeny and its dual isogeny (cf. [16, Theorem 1] ).
Notation and Elementary Constructions
Throughout, we work over fields of characteristic not 2 or 3. Let
be an elliptic curve over such a field K . (Recall that for an equation in this form to define an elliptic curve, the discriminant −16(4 A 3 + 27B 2 ) must be nonzero.)
Galois conjugates For every automorphism σ of K , we have a conjugate curve
If φ : E 1 → E 2 is an isogeny, then we obtain a conjugate isogeny σ φ : σ E 1 → σ E 2 by applying σ to the defining equations of φ, E 1 , and E 2 . We write ( p) for the p-th powering automorphism of F p . We note that ( p) is trivial to compute on
Quadratic twists and twisted endomorphisms For every nonzero λ in K , the quadratic twist of E by λ is the curve over K (λ 2 ) defined by
It is important to distinguish conjugates (marked by left superscripts) from twists (marked by right superscripts); note that σ (E λ ) = ( σ E) σ λ for all λ and σ .
Quadratic twists over finite fields
If μ is a nonsquare in K = F q , then E √ μ is a quadratic twist of E. But E √ μ 1 and E √ μ 2 are F q -isomorphic for all nonsquares μ 1 and μ 2 in F q (the isomorphism δ( √ μ 1 /μ 2 ) is defined over F q because μ 1 /μ 2 must be a square); so, up to F q -isomorphism, it makes sense to speak of the quadratic twist. We let E denote the quadratic twist when the choice of nonsquare is not important. Similarly, if ψ is an F q -endomorphism of E, then ψ denotes the corresponding twisted F q -endomorphism of E .
Traces and cardinalities
If K = F q , then π E denotes the q-power Frobenius endomorphism of E. The characteristic polynomial of π E has the form
Explicit isogenies Let S ⊂ E be a finite subgroup defined over K ; Vélu's formulae ( [26, §2.4] , [49] ) compute the explicit (normalized) quotient isogeny
We will need explicit formulae for the cases #S = 2, 3, 5, and 7. If S = {0, (α, 0)} has order 2, then
If S has odd order d = 2e + 1, then it is defined by a kernel polynomial F(x) = e i=0 f i x e−i (so F(x(P)) = 0 if and only if P is in S \ {0}), and then
and
Legendre symbols The Legendre symbol n p is defined to be 1 if n is a square mod p, −1 if n is not a square mod p, and 0 if p divides n.
Reduced lattice bases We work exclusively with the infinity norm · ∞ in this article (recall (a, b) ∞ := max(|a|, |b|)). An ordered basis [e 1 , e 2 ] of a lattice in Z 2 is reduced if
a reduced basis has minimal length with respect to · ∞ (see [22] ). 
Quadratic Q-curves and Their Reductions
Let p be a prime inert in Q( √ Δ) (equivalently, Δ is not a square in F p ), of good reduction for E and prime to d. If O is the ring of integers of Q( √ Δ), then
Looking at the Galois groups of our fields, we have a series of injections
for all α, β, γ , and δ ∈ Q.
Applying σ to φ, we obtain a second d-isogeny σ φ : σ E → E traveling in the opposite direction, which reduces mod p to a conjugate isogeny ( p) 
Technically, σ φ and ( p) φ are-up to sign-the dual isogenies of φ and φ, respectively. The sign p depends on p: if τ is the extension of σ to Q( √ Δ,
Observe that ( p) π p • π p = π E and π p • ( p) π p = π(p) E . Composing π p with φ yields a degreepd endomorphism
We also obtain an F p 2 -endomorphism ψ on the quadratic twist E .
If d is very small, then ψ and ψ are efficient because φ is defined by polynomials of degree about d, and π p acts as a simple conjugation on coordinates in F p 2 (as in Eq. (7)). In this article, we concentrate on prime d ≤ 7. Theorem 1. The endomorphisms ψ and ψ satisfy
respectively. There exists an integer r satisfying 5
such that
the characteristic polynomial of both ψ and ψ is
Similarly, choosing a nonsquare μ in F p 2 , so E = E √ μ and ψ = ψ √ μ , we find
The degree of ψ (and ψ ) is dp, so both have a characteristic polynomial in the form P ψ (T ) = T 2 − aT + dp for some integer a. Hence,
[a]ψ = ψ 2 + [dp] = [ p d]π + [dp]. 
The same holds for ψ and π E on E . Equation (8) relates r to the orders of E and E : We find
If E is supersingular, so r = 0, then [51, Theorem 1.1] yields a stronger statement:
The result follows on restricting to G; the argument for ψ and G is the same.
Q-curves:
Where from, and why? Now, we just need a source of quadratic Q-curves of small degree. Elkies [11] shows that all Q-curves correspond to rational points on certain modular curves: 6 Let X * (d) be the quotient of the modular curve X 0 (d) by all of its Atkin-Lehner involutions. If e is a point in X * (d)(Q) and E is a preimage of e in
where σ is the involution of Q( √ Δ)/Q. Luckily enough, for very small d, both X 0 (d) and X * (d) have genus zero-so we get not just plenty of rational points on X * (d), but a whole one-parameter family of Q-curves of degree d. Hasegawa gives explicit universal curves for d = 2, 3, and 7 in [20, Theorem 2.2]: for each squarefree integer Δ = 1, every Q-curve of degree d = 2, 3, 7 over Q( √ Δ) is Q-isomorphic to a rational specialization of one of these families.
Crucially, Hasegawa's families for d = 2, 3, and 7 are defined for any squarefree Δ; so we are free to start by fixing p, before choosing a Δ to suit. Indeed, the particular choice of Δ is theoretically irrelevant-since all quadratic extensions of F p are isomorphic-so we may choose any practically convenient value for Δ, such as one permitting faster arithmetic in
. Of course, one might ask why it is necessary to use this characteristic zero theory when we could simply search for curves over F p 2 with a d-isogeny to their Galois conjugate. But for low degrees d where X 0 (d) has genus zero, every such curve arises 6 The reader unfamiliar with modular curves can get away with the following here: the modular curve X 0 (d) parametrizes isomorphism classes of (cyclic) d-isogenies. If d is prime-which is the only case we need here-then there is a unique Atkin-Lehner involution ω on X 0 (d): Its action corresponds to exchanging isogenies φ with their duals φ † . The quotient X 0 (d) → X * (d):=X 0 (d)/ ω is a double cover, mapping (the isomorphism class of) an isogeny φ to the pair (of isomorphism classes) {φ, φ † }.
as the reduction mod p of a Q-curve over Q( √ Δ) where Δ is a nonsquare mod p. Indeed, the curves over F p 2 with d-isogenies to their Galois conjugates correspond (up to isomorphism) to points in
is isomorphic to P 1 over the ground field in the cases we consider, so every such point lifts trivially to a point in
We therefore lose no candidate curves over F p 2 by reducing Q-curves mod p instead of working directly over F p 2 . What we gain by working with Q-curves is some simplicity 7 and universality in our proofs, to say nothing of the wealth of mathematical literature to be raided for examples and theorems. For example, instead of deriving and proving defining equations for these families over F p 2 , we can just conveniently borrow Hasegawa's universal Q-curve equations.
GLS as the degenerate case
: then E = σ E, and we can apply our construction taking φ : E → σ E to be the identity map. Reducing modulo an inert p, we have ψ = π p and ψ 2 = π 2 p = π E , so ψ has eigenvalue ±1 on cryptographic subgroups of E(F p 2 ): clearly, ψ is of no use to us for scalar decompositions. However, the twisted endomorphism ψ on E satisfies (ψ ) 2 = −π E , so the eigenvalue of ψ on cryptographic subgroups is a square root of −1, which is large enough to yield good scalar decompositions. We have recovered the GLS endomorphism (cf. [16, Theorem 2] ).
While E (F p 2 ) may have prime order, E(F p 2 ) cannot: the fixed points of π p form a subgroup of order p + 1 − t 0 , where t 2 0 − 2 p = t E (and the complementary subgroup has order p + 1 + t 0 ). Hence, the largest prime divisor of #E(F p 2 ) can be no larger than O( p); the curve E can therefore never be twist-secure.
Short Scalar Decompositions
Before moving on to concrete families and examples, we will show that the endomorphisms developed in §3 yield short scalar decompositions. 
is the lattice of decompositions of 0, that is, of integer pairs (a, b) such that a + bλ ψ ≡ 0 (mod N).
We want to find a decomposition of m where a and b have minimal bit length, that is, where log 2 (a, b) ∞ is as small as possible. The following algorithm 8 computes an optimal decomposition of m given a reduced basis of L.
for L, computes a decomposition of minimal bit length (and bit length at most log 2 b 2 ∞ ) for any given integer m.
Input An integer m and a reduced basis
Step 1 Let α:=mb 22 /N and β:= − mb 12 /N .
Step 2 Let c be the shortest of the four vectors α b 1 
Proof. It is easily checked that (α, β) is the unique solution in Q 2 to the linear system αb 1 + βb 2 = (m, 0) (here, we use the fact that N = det L). Then, c is the closest vector to (m, 0) in L by Theorem 19 of [22] 
It remains to precompute a reduced basis for L. If |λ ψ | is not unusually small, then there exists a reduced basis of size O( √ N ). 9 Traditionally, we would compute it using the Gauss reduction or Euclidean algorithms (cf. [22] , [17, §4] and [15, §17.1.1]), but in our case lattice reduction algorithms are unnecessary: Following the approach outlined in [42] , we can immediately write down a reduced basis for a large sublattice of L, which coincides with L when G = E(F p 2 ). If G has a small cofactor in E(F p 2 ), then we can easily modify the sublattice basis to give a proper reduced basis for L (as we will do in Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 below). Instead of choosing c to be the shortest of the four vectors, Babai rounding approximates it by selecting c = α e 1 + β e 2 (this is the correct choice for most m). In terms of bit length, this means an excess of one bit in the worst case. 9 General bounds on the constant hidden by the O(·) appear in [40] , but they are far from tight for inseparable endomorphisms. Lemma 1 gives much better results for our endomorphisms in cryptographic contexts.
Lemma 1. The vectors e
In either case, the bit length of the reduced basis is log 2 ( p + p ) .
Proof. Corollary (2) implies r λ ψ ≡ p+ p and r p d ≡ ( p+ p )λ ψ (mod N), so e 1 and e 2 are in L; they are linearly independent, so they generate a sublattice. The determinant
is very small, so e 1 ∞ = e 2 ∞ = p + p . The bases satisfy Inequality (6) and hence are reduced.
Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 2
Let Δ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σ E 2,Δ,s = E 2,Δ,−s . To realize the Q-curve structure, observe that E 2,Δ,s has a rational 2-torsion point (4, 0). We compute the normalized quotient isogeny E 2,Δ,s → E 2,Δ,s / (4, 0) using Eq. (2), but then we observe that 
(The arbitrary choice of one of the two square roots of −2 results in an arbitrary sign on φ 2,Δ,s .) Conjugating and composing again, we find that
-and similarly, φ 2,Δ,s • σ φ 2,Δ,s = [ 2] σ E 2,Δ,s .
The discriminant of the family E 2,Δ,s is 2 9 · C 2,Δ (s) 2 · σ C 2,Δ (s), and 10 we find j ( E 2,Δ,∞ ) = 1728). We see that E 2,Δ,s reduces modulo any inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over F p 2 , and then, every value of s in F p yields an elliptic curve over F p 2 . (Proposition 1 below shows that at most two of these curves are isomorphic.)
, and let E 2,Δ,s and φ 2,Δ,s be the reductions modulo p of E 2,Δ,s and φ 2,Δ,s .
For each s in F p , the curve E 2,Δ,s /F p 2 has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
There exists an integer r satisfying
the characteristic polynomial of ψ 2,Δ,s and ψ 2,Δ,s is P 2,Δ,s (T ) = T 2 − 2r T + 2 p. In particular, if E 2,Δ,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ 2,Δ,s (G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ 2,Δ,s on G is
Proof. Apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 to φ 2,Δ,s using Eq. (12) . fields. The parameter s is defined by Hasegawa's choice (following Fricke) of a rational parametrization of the modular curve X 0 (2), that is, a birational map between P 1 and X 0 (2) . Under this parametrization, the point at infinity on P 1 corresponds to the isomorphism class of the 2-isogeny (in fact, the endomorphism) 1 + ι, where ι is an automorphism of order 4 of the curve with j-invariant 1728; this reflects what we find when we put s = ∞ in the formula for j ( E 2,Δ,s ).
Both E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) and E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) contain points of order 2: They generate the kernels of ψ 2,Δ,s and ψ 2,Δ,s . If #E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) = 2 k N and #E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) = 2 k N with N and N odd, then Eq. (1) modulo 8 implies that either k = k = 1, or k = 2 and k ≥ 3, or k ≥ 3 and k = 2. Equation (11) modulo 3 implies that if p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then either E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) or E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) contains a point of order 3.
Optimal decompositions In view of the Pohlig-Hellman-Silver reduction [34] and the rational 2-torsion point on E 2,Δ,s , the "optimal" situation for discrete-log-based cryptosystems is when E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) ∼ = Z/2Z × G with #G prime (though for faster arithmetic, we may want a cofactor of 4 instead of 2; we consider this later). Lemma 2 constructs an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case. We can use this basis in Algorithm 1 to decompose scalar multiplications in G as In either case, the bit length of the reduced basis is log 2 ( p + p − |r |) .
Proof. Let L 0 := e 1 , e 2 with e 1 :=( p+ p , −r ) and e 2 :=(− p 2r, p+ p ) as in Lemma 1; then, [L : L 0 ] = 2, so exactly one of e 1 /2, e 2 /2, or (e 1 + e 2 )/2 is in L. Equation (11) shows that 2N = ( p + p ) 2 − 2 p r 2 with |r | < √ 2 p; since N is odd, r must also be odd, so e 2 /2 is in Z 2 , but e 1 /2 and (e 1 + e 2 )/2 are not-and hence they cannot be in L, either. We conclude that L = e 1 , e 2 /2 . Inequality (6) is satisfied by b 1 := − e 2 /2 and b 2 :=e 1 ±e 2 /2 (with the sign chosen according to whether p r is positive or negative), so [b 1 , b 2 ] is a reduced basis for L. The longer of the vectors is b 2 , and b 2 ∞ = p+ p −|r |. Example 1. Let p = 2 127 − 1 and Δ = −1. Taking s = 28106 in the family E 2,−1,s /F p ( √ Δ) yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level: We have p = 1 and t E 2,−1,28106 = −272082382382015736940757543628153813996, so
where N and N are 253-bit primes. 11 Algorithm 1 and Lemma 2 transform 253-bit scalar multiplications in E 2,−1,28106 (F p 2 )[N ] into 128-bit multiexponentations. This value of s is the "smallest" (counting upwards from 1) yielding a curve-twist pair such that both curve orders are twice a prime. The curve coefficients, being linear in s, are relatively small; but while small coefficients are important in optimized implementations, here this is no more than a happy coincidence-we did not explicitly search for an example with convenient coefficients.
Montgomery models
The curve E 2,Δ,s has a Montgomery model over F p 2 if and only if 2C 2,Δ (s) is a square in F p 2 by [33, Proposition 1]-or equivalently, if 1 + s √ Δ is a square in F p 2 (since 2 is always a square in F p 2 ). Setting Montgomery models offer a particularly efficient arithmetic using only the X and Z coordinates [31] . The induced endomorphism on the (X : Z )-line is
an implementation of fast scalar multiplication using ψ M 2,Δ,s is detailed in [9] .
Twisted Edwards models Every Montgomery model corresponds to a twisted Edwards model and vice versa (cf. [3, 21] ). Indeed, E 2,Δ,s is isomorphic to the twisted Edwards model and E TE 2,Δ,s are defined over F p 2 ) if and only if E 2,Δ,s has full rational 2-torsion. The optimal situation for discrete-log-based cryptography on these curves is therefore when E 2,Δ,s (F p 2 ) ∼ = (Z/2Z) 2 × G with #G prime. Lemma 3 gives a reduced basis for the GLV lattice in this case, which we can use in Algorithm 1 to decompose scalar multiplications in G as -if p = 1 and r < 0, then [(e 1 − e 2 )/2, −e 2 /2] is a reduced basis for L; -if p = −1 and r ≥ 0, then [e 1 /2, e 2 /2] is a reduced basis for L; -otherwise, if p = −1 and r < 0, then [e 1 /2, −e 2 /2] is a reduced basis for L.
In each case, the bit length of the reduced basis is log 2 ( p + p ) − 1.
Proof. The sublattice L 0 = e 1 , e 2 has index 4 in L. Equation (11) implies ( p+ p ) 2 ≡ 2 p r 2 (mod 4), and since p + p is even, r must be even as well; so we can replace the relation p r λ 2,Δ,s ≡ p + p with p (r/2)λ 2,Δ,s ≡ ( p + p )/2 (mod N). Hence, both e 1 /2 and e 2 /2 are in L; so they must form a basis for L. The listed bases are combinations of e 1 /2 and e 2 /2 satisfying Ineq. (6) and are therefore reduced. The longest vector in each basis has length ( p + p )/2.
Doche-Icart-Kohel models
Doubling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel models are defined by equations of the form y 2 = x(x 2 + Dx + 16D). These curves have a rational 2isogeny φ with kernel (0, 0) , and both φ and its dual φ † are in a special form that allows marginally faster doubling using the factorization [2] = φ † φ (see [10, §3.1] for details). Our curves E 2,Δ,s come equipped with a rational 2-isogeny, so it is natural to try putting them in Doche-Icart-Kohel form. The same 2-isogeny plays two rôles in this situation: as a factor of our endomorphism for scalar decomposition, and as a factor of the doubling map for Doche-Icart-Kohel arithmetic. We emphasize that these two applications are distinct and complementary, and their benefits are cumulative. We have an isomorphism from E 2,Δ,s to the Doche-Icart-Kohel model
is not a square in F p 2 , then E DIK 2,Δ,s is F p 2 -isomorphic to E 2,Δ,s .
Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 3
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σ E 3,Δ,s = E 3,Δ,−s . To realize the degree-3 Q-curve structure, note that x − 3 defines an order-3 subgroup S = {0, (3, ± σ 
Conjugating and composing again, we see that 
(letting s → ∞, we see that j ( E 3,Δ,∞ ) = 0). Hence, E 3,Δ,s reduces modulo any inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over F p 2 , and then, every value of s in F p yields an elliptic curve over F p 2 . A calculation similar to Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p − 8 non-isomorphic curves in this way. 
There exists an integer r satisfying 3r 2 = 2 p + p t E 3,Δ,s such that Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (13) .
Optimal decompositions The kernel of ψ 3,Δ,s is generated by the rational points (3, ± σ C 3,Δ (s)), so #E 3,Δ,s (F p 2 ) is always divisible by 3. However, the nontrivial points in the kernel of the twisted endomorphism ψ 3,Δ,s are not defined over F p 2 (they are conjugates), so it is possible for E 3,Δ,s (F p 2 ) to have prime order.
From the point of view of the Pohlig-Hellman-Silver reduction, the "most secure" curves in E 3,Δ,s /F p 2 have E 3,Δ,s (F p 2 ) ∼ = Z/3Z × G, with G of prime order. Lemma 4 gives an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case (for a prime-order twist, the basis of Lemma 1 is already optimal). In either case, the bit length of the reduced basis is log 2 ( p + p − 2|r |) .
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 2, with 3 in place of 2. The sublattice e 1 , e 2 has index 3 in L, so exactly one of 1 3 e 1 , 1 3 e 2 , 1 3 (e 1 +e 2 ), and 1 3 (e 1 −e 2 ) is in L. Equation (11) gives 3N = ( p + p ) 2 − 3 p r 2 , but p ≡ − p (mod 3), so 1 3 e 2 is in Z 2 . On the other hand, 3 r (since otherwise 3 | N ), so neither 1 3 e 1 nor 1 3 (e 1 ± e 2 ) is in Z 2 . Hence, e 1 , 1 3 e 2 is the only lattice in Z 2 containing e 1 , e 2 with index 3, so L = e 1 , 1 3 e 2 . The vectors 1 3 e 2 and e 1 ± 2e 2 /3 satisfy Ineq. (6) , so they form a reduced basis for L; the longest of their components is p + p − 2|r |. Example 2. Let p = 2 127 −1; then, Δ = −1 is a nonsquare in F p . The parameter value s = 10400 yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level: #E 3,−1,10400 (F p 2 ) = 3 · N and #E 3,−1,10400 (F p 2 ) = N , where N and N are 253-and 254-bit primes, respectively. As in Example 1, this is the smallest value of s yielding a curve-twist pair with orders in this form. Any scalar multiplication in E 3,−1,10400 (F p 2 )[N ] or E 3,−1,10400 (F p 2 )[N ] can be computed via a 127-bit multiexponentiation using Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 4. (We warn the reader that here, one of the curve coefficients is quadratic in s, so small values of s may not yield particularly convenient coefficients for serious implementations.)
Doche-Icart-Kohel models
We can exploit the 3-isogeny on E 3,Δ,s for faster tripling (cf. [10, §3.2]): E 3,Δ,s is isomorphic to the tripling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel model
Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 5
For d = 5, Hasegawa notes that it is impossible to give a universal Q-curve for arbitrary squarefree Δ: There exists a quadratic Q-curve of degree 5 over Q( √ Δ) if and only if 5 p i = 1 for every prime p i = 5 dividing Δ (see [20, Proposition 2.3] ). This restricts our choice of Δ for a given p.
The special case Δ = −1 is particularly interesting: By the above, there exists a family of Q-curves of degree 5 over Q( √ −1), and every prime p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is inert in Q( √ −1). We work this case out in detail below. The remaining case p ≡ 1 (mod 4) is a straightforward exercise: Given a fixed prime p > 5, we choose a squarefree Δ meeting the condition above and then apply [20, Theorem 2.4] to derive a family of degree-5 Q-curves over Q( √ Δ) amenable to the construction of Sect. 3. 12 Of course, compared with d = 2 and 3, endomorphisms with separable degree d = 5 are intrinsically slower. The chief interest of this family is that unlike with d = 2 and 3, here neither the generic curve nor its twist have rational torsion points, so it is possible for reductions and their twists to both have prime order.
Let E 5,−1,s be the family of elliptic curves over Q( √ −1) defined by
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q.
The family E 5,−1,s is a family of Q-curves of degree 5: The polynomial 
The family has discriminant −2 6 Hence, E 5,−1,s is an elliptic curve for all s in Q \ {0, 2/11}, and these E 5,−1,s have good reduction at any p > 5 inert in Q( √ −1). The analogue of Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p − 25 non-isomorphic curves in this way. In particular, if E 5,−1,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E 5,−1,s (F p 2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ 5,−1,s (G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ 5,−1,s on G is
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (14) .
Reductions of curves in E 5,−1,s may have prime order, and so can their twists. In this situation, Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 1 computes optimal scalar decompositions for ψ 5,−1,s (of bit length at most log 2 ( p + 1) ).
Example 3. Let p = 2 127 − 1 and Δ = −1. Taking s = 7930 in the degree-5 family yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level: The trace of E 5,−1,7930 is t E 2,−1,28106 = 160084314926568661653252069280514036151, so #E 5,−1,7930 (F p 2 ) and #E 5,−1,7930 (F p 2 ) are both 254-bit primes. We transform 254bit scalar multiplications in E 5,−1,7930 (F p 2 ) into a 127-bit multiexponentiations using Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 1. As in Examples 1 and 2, this is the smallest value of s yielding a curve-twist pair with both curves of prime order. (Here, the curve coefficients are quartic and sextic in s, so the smallness of s has little effect on the convenience of the coefficients for implementations-however, as we remarked above, this family is essentially of theoretical interest.)
Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 7
For completeness, we include a family of Q-curves of degree 7. These curves are less interesting for practical applications, since the higher degree renders the endomorphism intrinsically slower than the curves with d = 2, 3, and 5.
Let Δ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family The family E 7,Δ,s is a family of quadratic Q-curves of degree 7. More explicitly: E 7,Δ,s has a subgroup S of order 7 defined by the kernel polynomial 
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (15).
Exceptional CM and Four-Dimensional Decompositions
By definition, Q-curves do not have CM. However, if E s is a family of Q-curves, then some isolated curves in E s may have CM. These exceptional curves are of interest for four-dimensional scalar decompositions: They form a natural generalization of the GLV + GLS curves described by Longa and Sica [29] .
Briefly: If E/Q( √ Δ) has CM by an order of small discriminant, then we can compute an explicit endomorphismρ of E of small degree (using Stark's algorithm [45] , say), which then yields an efficient endomorphism ρ on the reduction E of E modulo p, exactly as in the GLV construction. If E is d-isogenous to σ E and p is inert in Q( √ Δ), then E also has the degree-dp endomorphism ψ constructed in Sect. 3. The endomorphisms [1] , ρ, ψ, and ρψ may then be used as a basis for the four-dimensional decomposition techniques elaborated in [29] .
Practical limitations of four-dimensional decompositions "Q-curves with CM" inherit the chief drawback of the GLV construction: As noted in Sect. 1, we cannot hope to find secure (and twist-secure) curves when p is fixed. This scarcity of secure curves is easily explained: Reductions of CM endomorphisms (including GLV endomorphisms) are separable, and efficient separable endomorphisms have extremely small degree, so that their (dense) defining polynomials can be evaluated quickly. 13 But the degree of an endomorphism is the norm of the corresponding CM-order element; and to have non-integers of very small norm, the CM-order must have a tiny discriminant. Up to twists, the number of elliptic curves with CM discriminant −D is the class number 13 By dense, we mean that these polynomials have many nonzero terms; the cost of their evaluation therefore depends linearly on the degree. h(−D) (which is asymptotically in O( √ D)). The six orders containing endomorphisms of degree ≤ 3 have class number 1 and hence only one corresponding j-invariant. For −D = −4, corresponding to j = 1728, there are two or four F p 2 -isomorphism classes; for −D = −3, corresponding to j = 0, we have two or six; and otherwise, we have only two. In particular, there are at most 18 pairwise non-isomorphic curves over F p 2 with a nontrivial endomorphism of degree at most 3.
Over a fixed finite field, the probability that any of these curves will have a secure group order, let alone be twist-secure, is very low: Roughly speaking, we expect to try O(log 2 p) random curves over F p 2 before finding a twist-secure one (see [39] , for example, for more accurate heuristics). In practice, then, we cannot use these curves when p is fixed for efficiency. Higher-dimensional scalar decomposition speedups therefore come at the cost of suboptimal field arithmetic: We pay for shorter loop lengths with comparatively slower field (and hence group) operations, to say nothing of a more complicated multiexponentiation algorithm.
We must therefore choose between four-dimensional decompositions and faster underlying field arithmetic. Here, we have chosen the latter, so we do not treat CM curves in depth. However, we enumerate the exceptional CM curves in our families in Theorem 6, to provide a convenient source of curves for readers interested in exploring and implementing four-dimensional techniques.
Exceptional CM curves Any one-dimensional family of Q-curves has only finitely many exceptional CM curves, up to isomorphism, and it is easy to compute them. Proof. Suppose E/Q( √ Δ) is isogenous to σ E. If E has CM by the order of discriminant −D 0 f 2 , then so does σ E; hence, both j ( E) and σ j ( E) = j ( σ E) are roots of the Hilbert class polynomial H −D 0 f 2 . But H −D 0 f 2 is irreducible over Q, so either H −D 0 f 2 (T ) = T − j ( E) with j ( E) = j ( σ E) in Q, or H −D 0 f 2 (T ) = (T − j ( E))(T − j ( σ E)). Tables 1  and 2 list every quadratic imaginary discriminant −D 0 f 2 such that deg H −D 0 f 2 (which is the class number h(−D 0 f 2 )) is 1 or 2, along with the associated j-invariants: These can be found in the Echidna database [25] , or (re)computed using Magma ( [6, 48] ) or Sage [44] . To find the exceptional CM curves in each of our families, we solve for rational s and squarefree Δ such that the j-invariant of the family appears in Table 1 or 2.
Theorem 6 gives a simple alternative construction for some of the curves investigated by Guillevic and Ionica in [19] : The curves E 1,c and E 2,c of [19, §2] are E √ 3 2,Δ,s with Table 1 . Thirteen quadratic imaginary discriminants −D 0 f 2 of class number 1, together with the j-invariants of the elliptic curves over Q with CM by the quadratic order of each discriminant. 
